It is widely known that there exists a multitude of possible explanations for the maintenance of sex; however, it is less clear how to handle such an explanatory pluralism. In this paper, we address one older and one more recent discussion on what might constitute a good theory for sex and find that they reflect a trade-off between maximizing the scientific virtues of generalism, realism, and precision. A historical analysis indicates that varying research interests and research backgrounds of the different biologists shape the trade-off. We use the reflection on the trade-offs in order to understand the existence of the diversity of theories in the field and discuss how to address the explanatory pluralism. We find that the existence of multiple theories for sex, that is, explanatory pluralism, is not surprising or embarrassing but can be seen as a resource. Still, it is important to clarify the possibilities of integration of different theories. Integration between certain theories might be complex, however, as they involve models and theories from different disciplines that have diverged historically in both conceptual and methodological aspects. Key words: explanatory pluralism, Levins, maintenance of sex, philosophy of science, trade-off Explaining the maintenance of sexual reproduction has been called the ''queen of problems in evolutionary biology'' (Bell 1982) and remains a conundrum in evolutionary biology. Sex is the dominant form of reproduction in nature (Bell 1982) ; however, reproducing sexually is thought to be highly costly from one generation to the next (Williams 1975; Maynard Smith 1978) . Consequently, one would expect that an asexual lineage invading a population of conspecific sexuals should quickly drive the sexual population extinct (Maynard Smith 1978) .
Explaining the maintenance of sexual reproduction has been called the ''queen of problems in evolutionary biology'' (Bell 1982) and remains a conundrum in evolutionary biology. Sex is the dominant form of reproduction in nature (Bell 1982) ; however, reproducing sexually is thought to be highly costly from one generation to the next (Williams 1975; Maynard Smith 1978) . Consequently, one would expect that an asexual lineage invading a population of conspecific sexuals should quickly drive the sexual population extinct (Maynard Smith 1978) .
Many different theories have been proposed to solve the problem of sex. One scientist counted more than 20 different theories in the early 1990s (Kondrashov 1993) , and the number of theories has certainly not decreased since then. In philosophy of science, the existence of a multitude of theories or explanations for a specific phenomenon is commonly called explanatory pluralism (Mitchell 2003) . Thus, one philosopher of science once called research on the adaptive significance of sex the ''prime example of an explanatory pluralism in biology'' (Fehr 2001) . The question is of course how to handle such an explanatory pluralism. Traditionally, the different theories for sex have been seen as competing, but a more recent approach aimed at combining several theories (Howard and Lively 1994; West et al. 1999) . Even though this latter approach has been called a ''pluralist approach to sex,'' it first and foremost aimed at integrating different theories for sex. Ultimately, such integration would actually lead to a decrease in the explanatory pluralism present in the research area.
When evaluating the multitude of theories, scientists in the field have repeatedly touched upon the question of what would constitute a ''good'' theory for sex. In this context, they have emphasized different scientific qualities of theories that they thought to be essential (''scientific desiderata''), such as the possible generality of theories or how realistic they are. Over the years, there have in particular been 2 episodes where researchers offered more or less explicit considerations of such scientific desiderata. The first episode (between 1975 and 1982) comprised a series of important books on the evolution of sex written by eminent biologists (Williams 1975; Maynard Smith 1978; Bell 1982) , the second episode (in 1999) comprised a more recent discussion on the maintenance of sex in the ''Journal of Evolutionary Biology'' in response to a paper by West et al. (1999) .
Interestingly, in both cases, the debate seemed to reflect a trade-off in the realization of scientific desiderata similar to what had previously been described in a theoreticalphilosophical paper by the biologist Richard Levins on ''The strategy of model building'' (Levins 1966) . Among philosophers of biology, Levins' trade-off model has been appreciated as an adequate identification of scientific practice (Odenbaugh 2003; Plutynski 2006) . More specifically, Levins argued that models in biology often aim at maximizing generality, precision, and realism but that there is usually an inherent trade-off, so that one is only able to maximize 2 of these desiderata at the same time. Levins himself suggested that precisely which ones are emphasized ultimately depend on the purpose of the study. For example, models in applied science may be aimed at precision and realism, instead of generality in explanation, in order to maximize predictive power.
Here, we first describe how Levins' trade-off model can be applied to the 2 discussions around the adaptive significance of sex mentioned above, by looking whether the trade-offs that Levins recognized are present in this field of research. Next, we will address the question of what caused the trade-offs in this specific field of investigation. Levins himself argued that the trade-off usually stems from a difference in the purpose of model building. However, in our case, each scientist was interested in an explanation for the occurrence of the same evolutionary phenomenon, namely, sex. This means that the purpose of the explanation was in principle the same in each case, and the question therefore remains as to what caused the trade-off in the case of the research on sex. We will also investigate the consequences of the trade-off and how it connects to the existence of an explanatory pluralism in the field. Finally, we will link these issues with recent discussions on explanatory pluralism in the philosophy of biology. Ultimately, we hope to clarify why there exists an explanatory pluralism in the field of the adaptive significance of sex and discuss how it can be addressed appropriately.
Trade-Off between Scientific Desiderata
Following Levins (1966) , we identify the 3 different scientific desiderata (precision, realism, and generality) inherent in his trade-off scheme in the following way: We equate a ''precise'' explanation with mathematical and logical reasoning, whereas we use ''realistic'' for an explanation that is built upon patterns that are readily observed and verified in nature. A ''general'' explanation in our sense means that an explanation is applicable across a broad taxonomical range of species.
Books on the Evolution of Sex
In his book ''Sex and Evolution, '' Williams (1975) suggested a variety of possible short-term benefits to sexual reproduction. These simple, often verbal, models represented different scenarios demonstrating how sexual reproduction could be favored over asexual reproduction, depending upon different lifecycles and life histories. His models were named for organisms thought to typify their specifications, such as ''Aphid-rotifer model'' or ''strawberry-coral model.'' Thus, the explanations for the adaptive significance of sex were based on concrete biological scenarios and were therefore realistic. Williams described his models with verbal logic as a tool, so his models were both realistic and precise. However, the overall explanation for sex suffered from a lack of generality because Williams proposed a variety of taxon-specific models.
Maynard Smith (1978) reviewed, developed, and compared mathematical models for the adaptive significance of sex and recombination in his book ''The Evolution of Sex.'' He argued that of the models he presented, the ''hitchhiking and random linkage disequilibrium model,'' ''has the universality we seek. It must operate in all populations at all times. '' (Maynard Smith 1978, p. 123) . Thus, Maynard Smith aimed at maximization of generality. The mathematical nature of the model also made it very precise. But was it also realistic? Because he presented a population genetic model, it was not wholly unrealistic as it contained processes from natural Mendelian populations: Linkage disequilibria are a known property of the distribution of genetic variation in such a population. Nevertheless, we believe the hitchhiking model to be less readily verifiable, and therefore less realistic, than Williams' models that were based on more easily observable features such as life cycle and life history.
In his exhaustive review ''The Masterpiece of Nature, '' Bell (1982) linked the theoretical treatments by Williams and Maynard Smith to patterns from nature. He reviewed different sexual and asexual lifecycles, as well as the occurrence and distribution of sexuality in nature. He claimed that relatively simple population genetic models could not be a foundation for explaining sex. ''This nuisance is created by attempting to explain sex in too abstract a fashion, as though it were an ideal process whose mere material manifestations could be neglected, so that we are led into speculations whose worth cannot be established.'' (Bell 1982, p. 160) . Bell instead recommended the use of natural patterns for explaining the maintenance of sex. Natural patterns are the result of seeking for generality in empirical data and thus are relatively realistic; however, they can never be precise in a logical or mathematical sense.
In short, Williams' (1975) approach valued realism and precision over generality, whereas Maynard Smith (1978) ranked generality and precision highest. Bell (1982) , on the other hand, emphasized generality and realism in explanation, at the expense of precision (Figure 1a ).
The Discussion in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology
The second episode when researchers expressed scientific desiderata was a scientific debate published as a series of papers in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology (1999). The series of papers started with a review paper by West et al. (1999) , who proposed a ''pluralist approach to sex and recombination.'' Other researchers were invited to comment on this paper, and a total of 14 commentaries were published after the original article in the same issue of the Journal of Evolutionary Biology. West et al. (1999) suggested that more than one mechanism might play a role in maintaining sex. Both ecological and mutational theories had previously been proposed to maintain sex, and West et al. specifically argued for a combination of these models as they could interact in both additive and synergistic ways. The authors used as an example for such a combined model a simulation that showed the interactive process of mutation accumulation (Muller's ratchet) and parasite pressure (Red Queen model) Lively 1994, 1998) , therefore, the approach is precise. The Red Queen model is one of the best-confirmed models for the maintenance of sex (recently reviewed in Neiman and Koskella 2009), so it seems also, at least partly, realistic. Although the authors of the specific interactive model themselves believed it to be quite general (Lively CM, personal communication) , West et al. (1999) expanded the framework by arguing that several ecological and mutational models might be involved in the maintenance of sex and that the relative significance and occurrence of these mechanisms might be highly species specific. The idea suggested by West et al. (1999) thus had the advantage of being precise and realistic but might not be very general.
In one of the comments to the West et al. paper, Birky (1999) expressed among others the hope of finding a general explanation to the question of why sex is adaptive: ''I think it would be useful to look again for a general explanation of the prevalence of sex that applies to all eukaryotes and subsumes the detailed models. . ..'' In his view, general explanations are important in particular when explaining the significance of sex to the public or to students. He suggested that there is one general feature of sex that explains why it may be generally adaptive: Sex facilitates selection by breaking down negative linkage disequilibria (see also Barton and Charlesworth 1998) . Birky clearly valued the scientific criteria of precision and generality over realism, because the explanation neglects the detailed, more realistic, mechanisms. Butlin et al. (1999) commented that ''. . .it is premature to abandon studies of ''pattern'' in order to concentrate on parameter estimation and the testing of assumptions. . ..'' For example, patterns in the existence of clonal diversity and of ancient asexuality could be informative but are often neglected. Strategies of pattern search in nature are both general and realistic but certainly lack mathematical and logical precision.
From the discussion in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology, we saw that West et al. (1999) maximized realism and precision, at the possible expense of generality. Birky (1999) ranked generality and precision as high for explaining sex, whereas Butlin et al. (1999) aimed at realism and generality in explanation (Figure 1b ).
In conclusion, our presentation of the 2 episodes in the research history on sex supports the idea that there might be an inherent trade-off between maximizing generality, precision, and realism in explanation. We found that the various researchers involved aimed at different combinations of scientific desiderata, even though this pattern was perhaps less pronounced than what Levins (1966) implied. However, one should be very careful when applying such broad patterns of trade-off to research in general. We believe the pattern to be relatively strong in the case study, but it needs to be verified by looking at the specific causes that led to the expression of the trade-off in this research domain.
Research History: Causes and Consequences of the Trade-Off
In this section, we analyze the historical causes and consequences of the identified trade-off between scientific desiderata. More specifically, we investigate the context in which the researchers chose to emphasize exactly those specific desiderata. In our view, such an analysis needs to reflect upon the context of the approaches, including the tools, techniques and the overall framework under which the approaches developed. Philosophically, one might say that we analyze the context under which the approaches were able to show high explanatory power. We also analyze the consequences of the earlier trade-off and its influence on the overall explanatory pluralism found in the research domain of the maintenance of sex.
Causes Leading to the Trade-Off (1975 Until the 1970s, the Fisher-Muller theory for sex was the widely accepted explanation for why sex is the dominant form of reproduction in nature (Bell 1982) . The FisherMuller theory for sex had been developed by Fisher (1930) and Muller (1932 Muller ( , 1964 and formalized by Crow and Kimura (1965) . The argument was that sex is adaptive because it enhances the rate of evolution. The mixis of genetic material inherent in sexual reproduction results in the relatively quick combination of mutations in a single descendant, which should result both in new beneficial gene combinations (Muller 1932 ) and more efficient purging of deleterious mutations (Muller 1964) . In the 1970s, the situation for models on the maintenance of sex changed drastically. Maynard Smith (1978) declared that the book of Williams (1975) inspired him to reanalyze the grounds for the applicability of the Fisher-Muller model. The model depended upon group selection, and both Maynard Smith and Williams were the primary critics in a heavily fought debate among biologists over the importance of group selection. Maynard Smith (1978) in particular reacted to a publication by the animal ecologist Wynne-Edwards (1962) , who argued for the significance of group selection mechanisms in nature, whereas Williams reacted to a publication by Emerson (1960) . Both Maynard Smith (1976) and Williams (1966) wrote vigorous critiques on the group selection idea. Williams (1975) and later Maynard Smith (1978) became aware that it would be illogical to reject group selection in general while accepting a group selection explanation for the evolution of sex (described in Maynard Smith 1978) . The Fisher-Muller theory was regarded as a group selection mechanism because the benefit would occur only after many generations. An analysis of what happens at the individual level revealed that sexual reproduction is first and foremost costly: Inherent in sexual reproduction is a 2-fold cost of meiosis or of producing males (Maynard Smith 1971 , 1978 Williams 1975) . Simultaneously, it turned out to be extremely difficult to detect convincing and general advantages to sex at the individual level-even though both biologists suggested a variety of possible ideas (Williams 1975; Maynard Smith 1978) .
It is important to note that even though Maynard Smith (1971) first argued that the short-term costs of sex might present a problem to the maintenance of sex, it only became clear to the majority of researchers through Williams' (1975) book Sex and Evolution on the topic (see e.g., Bell 1982) . Williams was also the first to detect and point out the conceptual problems with simultaneously rejecting group selection and accepting long-term models for sex. Maynard Smith was principally trained as a population geneticist (with J.B.S. Haldane as his mentor), and he subsequently reviewed primarily the theoretical-mathematical evidence for the evolution of sex and recombination in detail in his book The Evolution of Sex (Maynard Smith 1978) .
In addition to Williams and Maynard Smith, Ghiselin (1974) also recognized the conceptual problem of the Fisher-Muller theory for sex relatively early. However, according to Bell (1982, in preface) , this book did not receive its due attention because of Ghiselin's attempt to reduce the arguments to the formal propositions of population genetics. Bell (1982) wrote that he himself was deeply impressed by all of the 3 books on the evolution of sex that appeared during the 1970s and wrote a fourth book, The Masterpiece of Nature, on this topic in 1982. This evolutionary biologist, who was initially trained as an ecologist, wrote this book because he felt ''a major contribution could be made by someone who had not the mathematical skills of Maynard Smith nor the perceptiveness of Williams nor the biological insight of Ghiselin, but owned enough of all 3 of these to borrow the rest.'' (Bell 1982, in preface) . Possibly because the biological insights by Ghiselin were not widely appreciated, Bell's book is today mainly appreciated through its comparative analysis of sexuality patterns in nature, such as geographic parthenogenesis. Indeed, Bell (1982, p 28) claimed that ''the most important job of the evolutionary biologist is to interpret broad patterns in nature.''
Explanatory pluralism was present in all 4 books on the evolution of sex. Williams' models were pluralistic in the sense that different models were presented depending upon different life histories of species, thus suggesting a compatible pluralism. On the other hand, Maynard Smith and Bell both saw the various models for sex as competing, and both expressed that they had a favorite model for sex: Maynard Smith the ''hitch-hiking model'' and Bell the ''Tangled Bank model '' (Maynard Smith 1978; Bell 1982) .
We conclude from the history of this research that Williams (1975) was primarily interested in broader conceptual problems of evolutionary theory and only later in theories for sex per se. He used verbal logic as a tool and, being interested in wider conceptual frameworks, was the first biologist to recognize the conceptual consequences of Maynard Smith's (1971) earlier insights on the costliness of sexual reproduction. Williams' (1975) book then was most important for pointing out this problem, and establishing the broad conceptual framework in which any future explanation for sex would have to be found. The explanatory power of this approach was to unify different theoretical aspects of evolution.
Maynard Smith (1978) was generally interested in theories for sex, and, as a population geneticist by training, used mathematical logic for investigating the processes leading to the evolution of sex in nature. In mathematics, generality and precision are valued over realism. Generality and precision grant uniformity and predictability, which is the reason why a mathematical approach generally provides high explanatory power. In fact, one of the assumptions of modern science since Newton is that the world consists in essence of mathematically describable mechanisms and processes. Bell (1982) had received his primary training in ecology and thus emphasized the value of natural patterns for delineating and testing theories for sex. These patterns had yet to be investigated in connection with the recently recognized problem that sexual reproduction posed to evolutionary biologists. Describing natural patterns means aiming at generality and realism. The explanatory power of observing natural patterns could be followed back to the philosopher Hume, who argued that observing a natural process usually means not to observe the process in itself but rather consistent patterns in nature (Hume 1758) .
Consequences of the Trade-Off (Mid-1980s-Mid-1990s) Several conferences were held on the topic of the evolution of sex in the mid-1980s, and publications from these conferences reflect the dramatic increase and variety in explanations proposed for the maintenance of sex (Stearns 1987; Michod and Levin 1988 ; Series of papers in Journal of Heredity 1993). These theories expand on the issues discussed in the 3 books by Williams (1975 ), Maynard Smith (1978 ), and Bell (1982 . It seems clear, however, that the number of theories and models for sex increased through the popularization of the subject; the published books on the evolution and maintenance of sex were written by influential biologists such as Maynard Smith and Williams. Furthermore, Bell's book helped to find ways to address the problem of sex empirically, and Bell certainly inspired other researchers to become interested in solving the evolutionary mystery of sex: After all, he dubbed the issue of the adaptive significance of sex to be the ''queen of problems in evolutionary biology'' (Bell 1982) . Importantly, researchers from various fields in biology began to contribute to the quest for an explanation for sex in the 1980s: The explanations expanded from the theoretical field of population genetics into the theoretical and empirical research fields of ecology, cell biology, paleontology, and molecular biology (see e.g., conference papers above). The ensuing diversity of explanations significantly increased the explanatory pluralism already present in the research area.
Studies on the adaptive significance of sex were done within different disciplinary frameworks. It is important to assess whether and how the disciplinary frameworks affected the different explanations for sex, as each discipline has its own inherent features, such as techniques and methods used, journals read, or type of conference attended. We will narrow the analysis further by exploring how only 2 of the disciplinary frameworks influenced theories for the maintenance of sex. In particular, we will focus on the mutational and ecological theories for sex. We will first describe how the respective conceptual frameworks for the 2 types of theories differed, and then focus on how tools and techniques used in the different disciplinary frameworks might have influenced mutational versus ecological explanations for the adaptive significance of sex.
All mutational and ecological models for sex, including Muller's ratchet, the Red Queen model, and the TangledBank model, emphasize the effect of sexual reproduction on the distribution of genetic variation in populations or among offspring. Ultimately, all of these models, including the so-called ecological models, can thus be expressed in population genetic terms (see, e.g., Kondrashov 1993) . It is then interesting to notice that ecological and mutational models for sex actually differ in their assumptions of what type of genetic variation is important in determining the adaptive significance of sex. While mutational models for sex emphasize the genetic variation provided through deleterious mutations, ecological models emphasize the genetic variation that is maintained through spatial and temporal differences in selective forces. This picture coincides with assumptions of the nature of genetic variation made by the ''neoclassical'' school versus the ''balance'' school (Lewontin 1974) . Thus, mutational and ecological theories for sex are ultimately grounded in 2 historically different conceptual frameworks of population genetic theory.
Ecological and mutational models for the adaptive significance of sex were empirically explored in their respective disciplinary frameworks. Ecological theories were tested from the mid-1980s on with the toolbox of ecology (field experiments, comparative data, and phenotypic variation). Much of the toolbox for testing mutational models, however, only became available (and largely functional) in the 1990s (for an overview of methods see Rice 2002) . How the problem of sex was tested in the 1980s within an ecological framework is exemplified by a series of studies conducted by Antonovics and coworkers. They used an experimental field setting and the grass Anthoxantum odoratum to explicitly test the importance of crucial features inherent to different models for sex (e.g., Antonovics and Ellstrand 1984; Ellstrand and Antonovics 1985; Schmitt and Antonovics 1986) . They found that density dependence did not affect the fitness of sexual versus asexual plants, whereas frequency dependence did. These results, along with Burt and Bell (1987) , supported the Red Queen model for the maintenance of sex but were not consistent with the Tangled Bank model (Bell 1982) . This led in part to the decline of the Tangled Bank model and the rise of the Red Queen model.
The ecological Red Queen theory was tested and supported in the 1980s and 1990s through a series of studies done by Lively and his group (Lively 1987 (Lively , 1992 Lively 1995, 1998; Jokela and Lively 1995) . The techniques involved were comparative field studies, followed up by experimental laboratory and further, more detailed field studies, using as a freshwater snail as model organism. Although Lively was originally interested in testing the Tangled Bank model for sex (see Ghiselin 1974; Bell 1982) , his work with the model organism made him see the importance of parasites and the Red Queen hypothesis for sex as a possible explanation for the maintenance of sexual reproduction in this species (Lively CM, personal communication) .
The Red Queen hypothesis for sex is based on the idea that the biotic environment can be a powerful selective force. If this environment changes unpredictably over time, which is the case when parasites are involved, sexual reproduction might be a benefit to encounter these biotic enemies (Jaenike 1978; Hamilton 1980; Hamilton et al. 1990 ; recently reviewed in Neiman and Koskella 2009). More specifically, the idea is that rare host genotypes are more likely to escape parasitism, and sexuality creates rare genotypes more readily. However, Red Queen models maintain sex and recombination only when parasites are highly virulent (May and Anderson 1983; Howard and Lively 1994) .
Mutational models for sex stayed the main focus of attention of theoretical population geneticists. The mutational models were extended to include a variety of parameters, such as epistasis between mutations (Kondrashov 1988) , population size (Lynch et al. 1993) , and interactions between deleterious and beneficial mutations (Manning and Thompson 1984; Peck 1994 ). In particular, Kondrashov's (1988) mutational deterministic theory seemed plausible to many researchers (Wuethrich 1998) . The mutational deterministic model suggested that sexual reproduction is adaptive because sexuals can purge mutations so efficiently that a 2-fold cost of making males can be compensated (Kondrashov 1988) . However, this efficiency depends on a number of assumptions: Mutational effects have to be strongly synergistic (negative epistasis), the mutation rate per generation per genome has to be suitably high, and asexuals have to arise in mutationselection balance.
Much of the empirical exploration of mutational models had to wait until the late 1990s when the models could be more rigorously and efficiently addressed (Rice 2002) . By then, the Red Queen was the most popular among the hypotheses for the maintenance of sex (see Ridley 1994) . In the late 1990s, researchers started exploring mutational theories mostly using small laboratory organisms with relatively short generation times, such as RNA viruses, yeast, Escherichia coli, Chlamydomonas, and Drosophila (see review by Rice 2002) . Mutational models give a relatively long-term advantage to sex, meaning that experimental manipulation must be conducted with organisms where results can be expected in a reasonably short time frame. Ecological theories, on the other hand, are most easily investigated using field organisms, because these consist of larger eukaryote species, such as snails, dandelions, bark beetles, flatworms, and geckos. In these organisms, it is relatively easy to assay parasite loads or niche differentiation (e.g., Moritz et al. 1993; Johnson 2000; Michiels et al. 2001; Meirmans et al. 2003 . Thus, the model organisms used to test mutational models stand in contrast to those used for ecological theories.
In conclusion, an extensive explanatory pluralism for sex was emerging in the 1980s. This pluralism was not directly connected to the trade-off between generality, precision, and realism found in the 1970s. It was, however, a direct consequence from the fact that Williams' (1975) book had made the importance of the problem of sex clear to a wide scientific audience. Subsequently, a large number of theoretical and empirical researchers from different biological disciplines started to be interested in this problem and wanted to contribute to its solution. The considerable extension of the explanatory pluralism in the 1980s resulted from this interest. Furthermore, Maynard Smith (1978) expanded the conceptual framework and reviewed and newly analyzed theoretical considerations around the benefits for sex. He thus laid the groundwork for further theoretical investigation in the research domain. Bell's (1982) review of the empirical evidence helped biologists see which types of evidence could throw light on the problem of sex and laid the grounds for further empirical exploration in the research domain. Overall, Maynard Smith (1978) and Bell (1982) provided good theoretical and empirical overviews for ecologists and geneticists for exactly how to proceed further with respect to mutational and ecological theories for sex.
Causes Leading to the Expression of the Trade-Off in 1999
Around the middle of the 1990s, there seemed to be an overall consensus on the value of 2 models in particular (Wuethrich 1998) ; the deterministic mutational hypothesis (Kondrashov 1988 ) and the Red Queen hypothesis (Jaenike 1978; Hamilton 1980; Hamilton et al. 1990 ). In general, mutational and ecological models and theories for sex were seen as competing (Kondrashov 1993; Hurst and Peck 1996) , even though some researchers had already pointed out the possible compatibility of theories (e.g., Maynard Smith 1986; Michod and Levin 1988) . This latter perspective seemed only to have gained widespread acceptance through a paper by West et al. (1999) that specifically argued for the compatibility of mutational and ecological models for sex. The idea for this paper sprung out of a summer workshop in 1997, where Lively presented a talk indicating a possible synergism between a mutational model (Muller's ratchet) and an ecological model (Red Queen hypothesis) for the maintenance of sex (West SA, and Lively CM, personal communication) . The original idea of a synergism between mutational and ecological models for sex was first developed as a verbal model, and subsequently published as a simulation model (Howard and Lively 1994) . West et al. (1999) represented the research situation in a rather dramatic way, arguing that both of the most promising theories for sex, namely, Red Queen and the mutational deterministic hypothesis, had assumptions that were not met, or were unlikely to be met, in nature. Furthermore, they argued that, when viewed as compatible instead of as competitive, the theories could actually ''help each other out'' in their difficulties. Thus, a compatible pluralism might provide a better, more realistic explanation for the maintenance of sex than any single theory. The authors also argued that several of the ecological and mutational theories might be involved and/or interact to maintain sex, and that this might differ between species. The paper was titled ''A pluralist approach to sex and recombination.'' To philosophers, this terminology might be surprising because one of the central ideas of the paper was an integration of models rather than pluralism in explanation.
Other biologists who attended the 1997 workshop or who were working on the subject of the maintenance of sex were invited by the Journal of Evolutionary Biology to comment on the value of West et al.'s approach (series of papers in Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 1999). We presented some of the details of this 1999 discussion above. Interestingly, the emphasis on generality and precision in explanation again drew on insights from population geneticists who used mathematical modeling as a scientific tool (Barton and Charlesworth 1998) , whereas emphasis on generality and realism reflected a value assigned to the search for general patterns done by more empirically working field and laboratory biologists, such as Butlin, Schön, and Martens. We conclude that the emphasis on different scientific desiderata presented earlier for the discussion in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology can directly be extrapolated from the trade-off expressed in the books on the evolution of sex: The trade-off in 1999 again arose out of the fact that the involved biologists differed in their scientific background. Mathematically trained population geneticists particularly focused on maximizing generality and precision, whereas other biologists that were working in the field or laboratory emphasized the value of natural patterns (generality and realism), at least where these patterns were still relatively little explored. Similar to Williams in 1975, the approach by West et al. (1999) was first developed as a verbal model. Correspondingly, it presented a radical new thinking on an important research topic and attempted to unify different aspects of evolutionary theory; in this case mutational and ecological theories for sex. This attempt resulted again in a precise and realistic, but perhaps less general, speciesspecific approach.
Discussion
We described that Levins' (1966) framework of generality, precision, and realism nicely reflects the debate of what constitutes a good theory for the adaptive significance of sex. However, although Levins originally described the trade-off among scientific ambitions for use with theoretical models, we find that his framework can be roughly fit to a broader, overall discussion on the research on sex. Furthermore, the trade-off in our case did not reflect a difference in the purpose of the model or explanation, as Levins described, but rather reflected a difference in the overall scientific approaches employed by the various researchers. More specifically, we saw that both in the discussion in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology and in the 3 books that inspired the research on the evolution of sex, researchers who maximized generality and precision in their explanations were mathematically trained population geneticists, whereas more empirically working field and laboratory biologists valued the empirical search for natural patterns. The patterns were often used to test pre-existing models for the maintenance of sex. These 2 approaches can be said to follow from the concept of modern science: assuming the world to consist of mathematically describable mechanisms while being able only to observe patterns in nature.
The 2 instances when precision and realism in explanation were maximized followed the recognition of severe problems. Williams (1975) became aware of a conceptual contradiction between the group selection model that was used to explain sex, and general evolutionary theory, which rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force. The pluralist approach (West et al. 1999) followed from the recognition that all simpler models for sex only gave a sufficient short-term advantage to overcome the 2-fold cost for unrealistic parameter values and assumptions. Both Williams' and West et al.' s approaches aimed at a solution of these problems by attempting to unify different aspects of evolutionary theory through radically new thinking. Both approaches were characterized by their development through verbal models.
An obvious question is whether we will ever be able to maximize all 3 desiderata and thus find the optimal explanation (or at least the optimal approach) for the maintenance of sex. As Orzack and Sober (1993) pointed out, there is no logical reason why we should not be able to achieve this goal. However, for pragmatic reasons, this will probably not happen: The subject matter is highly complex, whereas our scientific approaches remain relatively simple (Levins 1993; Plutynski 2006) . For example, a model that includes many parameters, and is thus highly realistic, might actually not be desirable because it becomes too complex and therefore ultimately intractable. This does, however, not mean that we cannot make scientific progress: Clearly, in 1999 the trade-off was shaped by a more profound understanding of the possible processes that may maintain sex than the trade-off in the 1970s and 1980s. What seems to be important is to be aware of one's own placement in the triangle and thus of the advantages and disadvantages of one's own approach in comparison with others. Progress made in one field of investigation can then help to shape research programs in other fields. In fact, this has often been done, for example, as described above, the theoretical research on the Tangled Bank model halted due to poor empirical confirmation of the model. In general, the 3 different approaches do not present a rigorous trichotomy (see also Levins 1993) , and they can thus at least partly be combined and interact with each other.
We are aware of one other paper that explicitly addressed a trade-off for the evolution of sex: Burt (2000) argued that although the function of sex could be explained through a general mechanism, understanding the distribution of sex in nature might require the inclusion of many detailed species-specific features. In our view, this perspective was innovative in showing how these 2 approaches might fit into an overall picture on the adaptive significance of sex. However, Burt's (2000) dichotomy between the function of sex and its distribution in nature should not become too dogmatic in the field because this dichotomy simply presents an alternative pragmatic way of addressing the problem of sex.
Our historical analysis showed that the extensive explanatory pluralism in the field of the maintenance of sex is an indirect consequence of the trade-off: The diversification of the explanations for the maintenance of sex during the 1980s was mainly due to the fact that biologists from other disciplines of biology became aware that sex was a problem. Their interest was stimulated through Williams' (1975) book, which had established that sexual reproduction provided a conceptual conundrum to evolutionary biologists. Furthermore, empirical and theoretical research was greatly helped by the review books written by Maynard Smith (1978) and Bell (1982) .
Since 1999, the situation regarding an explanatory pluralism in the research of sex may be somewhat different. Before 1999, explanatory pluralism existed, but it was largely seen as competitive. The conceptual contribution by West et al. (1999) was to suggest compatible pluralism in general and the integration of different models in particular.
Ultimately, the latter should lead to a decrease in pluralism. Although we find it too early to fully assess the impact of this conceptual contribution on the overall research field, we here want to reflect more generally on the possible scientific value of an explanatory pluralism, and how one might be able to handle it.
Even though scientists in the field of the maintenance of sex often seem to be somewhat embarrassed by the number of theories existing in their field, explanatory pluralism seems to be the norm rather than the exception in the biological sciences. Philosopher of biology Sandra Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 2002 Mitchell ( , 2003 recently argued that the common occurrence of explanatory pluralism in biology might simply reflect the nature of explanations and the complexity of the science. In general, scientific explanations have a simple structure in the sense that a set of general principles is supposed to explain composite or complicated phenomena. Thus, explanations are relatively simple and have often been found to be valid only under idealized conditions. Although this might be the case even in an ''exact science'' like physics (Cartwright 1982) , it might be especially pronounced in a science like biology (Mitchell 2003) . Indeed, many models and theories in biology have been shown to be spatiotemporally (Beatty 1995 (Beatty , 1997 Sober 1997) , and taxonomically restricted. Furthermore, causal explanations for a phenomenon often incorporate only certain aspects of biological organization and processes (Dupré 1993) . It is then no surprise that the explanatory pluralism in the field of the maintenance of sex is a direct consequence of the fact that scientists from a wide variety of different biological disciplines contributed to the subject. Explanatory pluralism could even be seen as a resource, providing a diversity of theoretical ideas and insights out of which progress may be made.
The question, then, is how to handle the apparent explanatory pluralism in the field of the maintenance of sex today. As follows from the above, a multitude of theories does not have to be looked upon as a sign of failure or immaturity. Still, it is important to clarify the possibilities of integration of different theories (see also Mitchell 2003) , and the paper by West et al. (1999) certainly paved the way for the widespread acceptance of such an idea. Several researchers expressed fears that testing for synergism between theories might be difficult per se; however, there are in principle several different available methodologies for doing so (reviewed in Meirmans and Neiman 2006) .
Our historical overview indicates that integrating mutational and ecological models for sex might nevertheless be a difficult task but due to other reasons than simply testing for several variables simultaneously. Rather, we found that the 2 model types differ both conceptually (the type of genetic diversity emphasized) and methodologically (techniques, model organisms, field vs. laboratory), and their integration might thus be difficult to achieve. The current dearth of empirical evidence toward such a synergism might be a witness to this difficulty. The few existing tests on a synergism between mutational load and parasite pressures circumvent these difficulties in various ingenious ways: Most of these studies extend from ecological studies on higher animals, and they then inferred mutational load indirectly, through, for example, estimates of embryo mortality (Bruvo et al. 2007 ), chemical induction (Killick et al. 2006) , or lineage age (Neiman et al. 2005) . One study extended from testing mutational models; in this case, the scientists used plasmids instead of the more traditionally used ''normal'' parasites (Cooper et al. 2005) . Even though the integration of concepts and methodologies from diverged fields is obviously hard to achieve, it is also extremely important: One might be able to address, and possibly correct, largescale biases and operational simplifications done in biological science.
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